 |
| This cartoon misses the point of the Ontological Argument |
(For
my MCCC Philosophy of Religion
students.)
Oral exam question #3: explain Kant's criticism of the Ontological Argument.
Here are the bullet points.
1. Kant says "exists" (or "being") is not a predicate.
For Kant there are two types
of predicates: Logical (analytic) and determining (synthetic). This is
important since Anselm's OA requires "actual existence" to be a
predicate (attribute) of "greatest possible being."
2. A
"logical" or "analytic" predicate analyzes the subject, but
adds nothing to the concept of the subject. A "determining" or
"synthetic" predicate adds something to the concept of the
subject.
Such
as:
a.
“John
the bachelor is not married” (analytic).
b.
“John
the bachelor is six feet tall” (synthetic).
3. In a subject-predicate statement,
"exists" is the "copula" (connector) that connects subject
and predicate.
4. If "exists" were a real predicate
then we would have the absurd situation that "the real contains more than
the merely possible."
Use
Kant's $100 example here.
If “exists”
was a predicate than we could never get what we are thinking of.
5.
For Kant the Ontological Argument fails because it depends on "actual
existence" being a predicate, and it is neither an analytic predicate nor
a synthetic predicate.
6. Philosopher Norman Malcolm agrees with Kant
that "exists" is not a predicate. But Malcolm thinks Anselm meant,
not "existence," but "necessary existence."
"Necessary
existence" does seem to be a predicate. For example: My wife Linda
necessarily exists.
This statement seems to make
an outrageous claim; viz., that my wife Linda cannot not-exist. It attributes
necessary existence to her, and thus seems to function as a predicate or
attribute.
FURTHER
EXPLANATION
Kant’s criticism of the Ontological Argument is that "exists," or
"existence," is not a "predicate." By "predicate"
we mean "attribute," or "quality."
Anselm's version of the Ontological Argument depends on "existence"
being a "great-making attribute." But if "existence" is not
an attribute at all, then Anselm's argument seems to fail. This is Kant's
criticism. "Exists," Kant says, "is not a predicate."
Consider the form of a subject-predicate statement:
S is p. 'S' denotes the subject,
'p' denotes the predicate.
For example, John's
car is red. "Red" is the predicate, or attribute, of the subject
"John's car." "Redness" is predicated of "John's
car." Or: "redness" is an attribute of "John's car."
In the statement John's car is red, where do we find "existence?"
"Exists" is found, Kant would say, in the verb "is."
"Is" is the "copula" (connector) that links subject and
predicate. The verb "is," in the statement John's car is red,
simply posits the existence of John's red car. This neither analyzes the
subject nor adds something to our concept (idea) of the subject.
Kant writes: "'Being' is
obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which
could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing,
or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is
merely the copula of a judgment."
What does that mean? Here is an example to illustrate that "exists"
(or "being," "is-ness") is not a real attribute or
predicate.
Consider this. I'm going to tell you some things about my wife Linda. I'll do
this by making a series of subject-predicate statements, predicating attributes
of the subject "My wife Linda."
·
My
wife Linda is 5'6" tall.
·
My
wife Linda has long brown hair.
·
My
wife Linda is a sushi-lover.
·
My
wife Linda is a piano teacher.
All
of these predicates add something to the concept "My wife Linda." But
consider this:
·
My
wife Linda exists.
That
adds nothing to the subject "My wife Linda." Actually, it functions
more like a tautology: My existing wife Linda has the attribute of
existence. That statement is tautological (redundant), which means the
predicate simply repeats the subject.
Try this.
You go for a job interview. The interviewer asks you to describe yourself,
which is another way of listing your attributes. You respond:
·
I
have computer skills.
·
I
graduated from Harvard.
·
I
have worked for Steve Jobs as his personal assistant.
·
I
invented the iPhone.
The interviewer, his eyes
wide open and jaw dropping to the floor, is amazed! Probably, he wants to hire
you. But then you open your mouth and say...
"Here's one more thing about myself, one more attribute I have that I want
to share with you: I exist."
That was a bad move. Because "exists" is not an attribute. And you
just lost the job.
Kant
further explains this by saying, "The real contains no more than the
merely possible." But if "exists" was a real predicate, then the
real would contain more than the possible, but that is absurd.
You say to me, “Please go to the bank and withdraw a hundred dollars.” That is,
you have in your mind the idea of one hundred dollars. I go to the bank with
that idea in mind and make the withdrawal. But upon making the withdrawal I now
have, instead of an idea of a hundred dollars in my mind, an actually existing
one hundred dollars in my hand.
Is the concept of a hundred dollars in my mind any different than the actual
hundred dollars in my hand? If you answer “Yes,” then is it because the hundred
dollars in my hand actually exists? In other words, is “existence” a predicate
of the hundred dollars I hold in my hand? If you say “Yes” to this, then the
hundred dollars in my hand is different than the hundred
dollars in your mind. I will have withdrawn from the bank something different
than what you asked me to withdraw. I withdrew something that has an extra
“predicate” which your idea did not have.
You are thinking of
$100. If we then add that the $100 "exists," in asserting that it
exists we add nothing to the concept of the $100. The $100 is the same whether
it exists or not; it is the same size, the same weight, the same colour, the same
value, etc. The fact that the $100 exists, that the concept-of-$100-in-the-mind
is exemplified in the world, does not change anything about the
concept-of-$100. Therefore “existence” is not a real, or first-order,
predicate.
A real predicate adds something to the concept, which is the
subject of the judgment. If the actual $100 has a predicate (“existence”) which
the idea of $100 does not have, then they are not the same thing. And the thing
I withdrew was not what you had in mind. Which seems absurd. I don't wish to
say "Here is the $100 you were thinking about but it has the extra
attribute of "existence."
Kant writes:
"A hundred real dollars do not contain
the least coin more than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter signify
the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should
the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case,
express the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it.
My financial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real
dollars than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility).
For the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my
concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state)
synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred dollars are not themselves in the
least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept. . .
."
(By "analytically contained" Kant
means a predicate that adds nothing to the concept of the subject, such as in
the statement: John the bachelor is not married. A
"synthetic" judgment contains a predicate that adds something to the
subject, because it is not analytically contained in the subject, such as: John
the bachelor is 99 years old.)
Therefore existence is
not a predicate. It merely posits the existence of the concept in mind. As Kant
puts it, a hundred real dollars contains as much as a hundred imaginary
dollars.
"The real contains no more than the possible."
For Kant to say that
something "exists" is to say that the concept of that thing is
exemplified in the world. Existence, then, is not a matter of a thing
possessing a property, "existence," but of a concept corresponding to
something in the world.
Anselm's version of
the Ontological Argument, at this point, seems to fail.
Kant writes of this in
his Critique of Pure Reason. The relevant passage is found here.
