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| Our back yard, on the river |
In my MCCC Philosophy of Religion class this coming Tuesday I will be especially explaining and arguing for the truth of premise 2 in William Lane Craig's version of the Moral Argument for God's Existence.
The moral argument for God's existence can be made using atheists to support both premises. The argument goes like this.
Premise 1 - If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
Premise 2 - Objective moral values and duties do exist.
The conclusion then follows deductively:
Therefore, God exists.
Atheistic justification of the first premise is seen here.
Atheistic support of Premise 2 is seen in, for example, this quote from atheist philosopher Colin McGinn:
When I assert 'this is good' or 'that is
evil', I do not mean that I experience desire or aversion, or that I have a
feeling of liking or indignation. These subjective experiences may be present;
but the judgment points not to a personal or subjective state of mind but to
the presence of an objective value in the situation. What is implied in this objectivity? Clearly, in the first place, it
implies independence of the judging subject. If my assertion 'this is good' is
valid, then it is valid not for me only but for everyone. If I say 'this is
good', and another person, referring to the same situation, says 'this is not
good', one or other of us must be mistaken... The validity of a moral judgment
does not depend upon the person by whom the judgment is made... In saying that
moral values belong to the nature of reality... the statement implies an
objectivity which is independent of the achievements of persons in informing
their lives with these values, and is even independent of their recognising
their validity. Whether we are guided by them or not, whether we acknowledge
them or not, they have validity... objective moral value is valid independently
of my will, and yet is something which satisfies my purpose and completes my
nature.
- McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction
Many atheists defend moral objectivism. Here's atheist Russell Shafer-Landau:
Some moral views are better than others,
despite the sincerity of the individuals, cultures, and societies that endorse
them. Some moral views are true, others
false, and my thinking them so doesn’t make them so. My society’s endorsement of them doesn’t prove their truth.
Individuals, and whole societies, can be seriously mistaken when it comes to
morality. The best explanation of this is that there are moral standards not of
our own making.
- Landau, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? p. viii
Further, any argument against moral objectivism would be self-refuting. One would then argue this way:
1. There are no objective
moral values (which is the same thing as to say moral values are only subjective), and
2. one objectively ought to accept
subjectivism.
Which is incoherent.
(Thanks throughout to Peter Williams' essay "Can Moral Objectivism Do Without God?")
