On Evolutionary Accounts of Ethical Beliefs

Lake Erie

Theistic philosopher J.P. Moreland recently teamed up to debate atheist Michael Shermer and others on the question "Is There Life After Death?" In the debate Shermer made two assertions that, argues Moreland, are logically inconsistent with each other.

Shermer's first assertion was: evolutionary explanations of theological and ethical beliefs/behaviors are readily available.

Shermer's second assertion was: lowed later in the debate by another claim by Shermer to the effect that Kantian objective intrinsic values and moral laws exist and can be known without the need for a God to ground either.

J.P. writes: "While these two claims are strictly logically consistent, the former provides a substantial undercutting defeater for the latter." That is, there's nothing illogical about either statement, take by itself. But both cannot be affirmed at the same time, as Shermer has. Consider, for example: a) John is a bachelor; and b) John's wife is Linda. Both statements are logically consistent. But (a) and (b) cannot be simultaneously affirmed. Re. Shermer's two statements, here's why:

"If our moral beliefs/behaviors resulted in our struggle for survival in light of the need to feed, fight, flee and reproduce, then those beliefs/behaviors do not track truth and are not counterfactually sensitive to it." J.P. then gives two examples of such counterfactual insensitivity. (On the meaning of "counterfactually sensitive," see "Counterfactual Theories of Causation," in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

Suppose, for example, that Kant's categorical imperative is actually true in our world; i.e., suppose it is actually true that we ought to treat people as ends in themselves, and not as means to some other end (e.g., don't lie to or kill or be racist towards them for the sake of our survival).

Moreland than asks us to consider a Twin Earth, just like ours, except that Kantian objective moral values are false. "In Twin Earth, we would have exactly the same moral beliefs/behaviors; that is, our beliefs/behaviors would be ours whether or not they were true." We would have evolved to believe things that would aid survival but were false.

Moreland adds: "In [yet] another possible world in which those beliefs/behaviors did not serve survival needs, then we would not have them. Thus, they track survival not truth."

"It follows that if an evolutionary account of moral beliefs/behaviors is accepted, these constitute an undercutting defeater for the reliability of our moral belief forming mechanisms and our action dispositions. There could still be an objective moral law, but it would be sheer coincidence if our beliefs/actions comported with it."

A sheer naturalistic (atheistic) evolutionary account that explains how we came to believe in certain objective moral values would only understand such moral values as an aid to survival, and thus inconsistent with objective truth.

See: J.P. Moreland, Michael Shermer on Evolutionary Accounts of Ethical Beliefs