The Euthyphro Dilemma

Flowers in my kitchen.

"The Euthyphro Dilemma is bogus," argues U of Wisconsin philosopher Keith Yandell. This is because the E.D. exemplifies a false dilemma.  False dilemma, in logic, is an either-or statement that does not exhaust the alternatives. For example: America: either love it or leave it. Oh really? Are there no other alternatives? But of course there are!

Here's Plato's Euthyphro Dilemma.

1. Either (i) God approves of something because it is good, or (ii) something is good because God approves of it.
2. If (i), then the ground or basis of something's being good lies outside, and is independent of, God.
3. If (ii), then something is good because God arbitrarily chooses it - what is good depends on mere divine voluntarism, sheer choice not constrained by reasons.
4. Therefore, either the ground ort basis of something's being good lies outside, or is independent of, God, or something is good because God arbitrarily chooses it - what is good depends on mere divine voluntarism, sheer choice not constrained by reasons.

One who accepts the E.D. takes statement 4 to mean: Either morality is indepedent of (monotheistic) religion, or morality simply amounts to what God arbitrarily chooses.

But this settles nothing. Yandell writes: "There are alternatives in addition to the two that the Euthyphro argument consiers. The argument would succeed only if there were not." ("Theology, Philosophy, and Evil," in For Faith and Clarity, ed. James Beilby) Here are some other possibilities.

• (iii) a necessarily existing God exists and is perfectly good by nature; this what God wills, God wills in accord with God's nature, not arbitrarily.
• (iv) God exists with logical necessity, and God necessarily has thoughts the propositional content of which is the true principles of morality.
• (v) God exists, though not with logical necessity, and God is good by choice; God wills in accord with God's character and not arbitrarily, and this character is what it is due to God's free choices.

The E.D., therefore, "should begin with a premise at least as complex as this:

(1*) Either (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v).

"But then the rest of the argument will not follow. The conclusion would then be much more complex:

(4**) Either morality is independent of (monotheistic) religion, or morality simply amounts to what God arbitrarily chooses; or a necessarily existing God exists and is perfectly good by nature; thus what God wills, God wills in accord with God's nature, not arbitraril; or God exists with logical necessity, and God necessarily thinks thoughts the propositional content of which is true moral principles; or God exists , though not with logical necessity, and God is good by choice; God wills in accord with God's character and not arbitrarily, and this character is what it is due to God's free choices.

Yandell then goes on to show that choices (iii) - (v) are genuine. Perhaps there are even some other alternatives? Yandell concludes, "It is sufficient to note that the Euthyphro argument fails to establish the intended dilemma for theists."