On Sunday night I gave a seminar The Problem of Evil and the Existence of God in my apologetics series at my church.
My talk went, briefly, like this.
I shared my own experience and encounter with evil. I explained that "evil," in the philosophical dialogue, usually means gratuitous suffering.
I presented J.L. Mackie's logical argument from evil, and how Mackie believed that it is simply illogical to affirm the following three statements at once: 1) God is all-loving; 2) God is all-powerful; and 3) Evil exists.
I then shared Alvin Plantinga's refutation of Mackie. Plantinga adds a 4th statement that affirms (1) and (2), and logically implies (3). That statement is: (4) God made a world in which there are free creatures who produce some moral goodness; and, all possible persons suffer from “transworld depravity.” Plantinga has shown that Mackie's logical argument against God's existence fails.
I then presented William Rowe's evidential argument from evil. Which is:
Premise 1 - There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Premise 2 - An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Conclusion - There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
I then shared a response that attackcs Premise 1 (Stephen Wyckstra) and a respisnbe nthat attacks Premise 2 (Greg Boyd).
Wyckstra's argument:
1. God’s wisdom and knowledge is considerably greater than that of humans.
2. If (1), then it is likely that the evil generated by cases of intense suffering that appear to be gratuitous are outweighed by some greater good.
3. If it is likely that the evil generated by cases of intense suffering that appear to be gratuitous are outweighed by some greater good, then it is likely that we would not have epistemic access to the reason for such suffering given our significantly limited cognitive perspective relative to God.
4. If it is likely that we would not have epistemic access to the reason for such suffering given our significantly limited cognitive perspective relative to God, then it is not likely that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
5. Therefore, it is not likely that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Boyd's theodicy can be found in his book Satan and the Prblem of Evil. It argues that there is, on Christian theism, gratuitous or pointless evil, thus its existence does not threaten the theistic viewpoint.
The best philosophical discussion of this issue is found in Daniel Howard-Snyder's collection The Evidential Argument from Evil.
See also Yale philosopher Marilyn McCord Adams's Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God.
