(These notes are for my MCCC Western Philosophy Class. We've been discussing Platonic and Cartesian mind-body dualism, the physicalism of Steven Pinker et. al, and now I'm wrapping up this class with reasons I think support a form of mind-body dualism.)
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY – Seven Reasons to Believe In the Existence of the Human Soul
Dr. John Piippo
I believe persons have souls. I believe we can make a cumulative case for the soul’s existence based on seven things:
1. The failure of physicalism and materialism to solve what Steven Pinker has called the “Hard Problem” of consciousness.
Dr. John Piippo
I believe persons have souls. I believe we can make a cumulative case for the soul’s existence based on seven things:
1. The failure of physicalism and materialism to solve what Steven Pinker has called the “Hard Problem” of consciousness.
2. Logical-philosophical arguments can be made to support mind-body dualism.
- Example: first-person subjective experience of sight
- Example: the zombie argument against physicalism
- Example: first-person subjective experience of sight
- Example: the zombie argument against physicalism
3. Neuroscientific and neuropsychological reasons can be given to support dualism.
4. The existence of human libertarian free will implies the existence of a nonphysical mind or consciousness.
5. Arguments can be made for the truth of Judeo-Christian theism. If the noetic structure of Judeo-Christian theism is true, it is rational to believe that we have souls.
6. A strong historical argument can be made for Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. If there is life after death, then the death of the physical body does not mean the end of consciousness.
7. Personal spiritual experience argues for the existence of the soul.
1. The Inability, In Principle, to resolve the “Hard Problem” (Pinker)
a. Recognition of the problem
b. Statement of the Problem
i. The really “hard” problem is the problem of experience, the subjective aspect of consciousness, the executive “I” and its amazingly private nature.
ii. “Why should physical processing give rise to a rich and private inner life at all?” asks philosopher David Chalmers. “It’s a mystery.”
c. The de facto logical impossibility of resolving the Hard Problem
d. It’s impossible to speak about a materialistic theory of “mind” without borrowing from dualistic “mind-language.”
1. The Inability, In Principle, to resolve the “Hard Problem” (Pinker)
a. Recognition of the problem
b. Statement of the Problem
i. The really “hard” problem is the problem of experience, the subjective aspect of consciousness, the executive “I” and its amazingly private nature.
ii. “Why should physical processing give rise to a rich and private inner life at all?” asks philosopher David Chalmers. “It’s a mystery.”
c. The de facto logical impossibility of resolving the Hard Problem
d. It’s impossible to speak about a materialistic theory of “mind” without borrowing from dualistic “mind-language.”
2. Two logical arguments against physicalism
a. First-person subjective experience of sight
i. Consider someone who is congenitally blind.
ii. If materialism is true, then such a blind person should be able to gain a full knowledge of what it is like, experientially, to see. He could deduce this from the physiology and functional organization of the human eye. He would simply need to be intelligent enough to grasp the concepts.
iii. IN OTHER WORDS, if there’s no such thing as non-material reality, then a blind person misses nothing in terms of knowledge if they cannot see. The blind man can get an adequate conception of physical color as it is described physically in terms of wavelengths of light and the reflective properties of pigment.
iv. But it does seem that a person who can see has a kind of knowledge that a blind-from-birth person could not have.
v. The only thing the blind person fails to grasp by the statement “The traffic lights are red” is that he does not know what kind of physical experience the sighted person has when he sees the traffic lights. John Foster writes: “But this knowledge is precisely what, if conceptual materialism were true, he should be able to deduce from the physical information available.” (“A Defense of Dualism,” in William Lane Craig, Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, p. 457)
vi. Foster writes: “The problem for the blind man is that the physical truths provide no introspective reference points at all. And for this reason, I cannot see how he could derive from them, in any sense, a full knowledge of what it is like, experientially, for the sighted organism to see.
vii. IN OTHER WORDS: There is a kind of knowledge that is non-physical.
viii. Therefore physicalism fails to do justice to first-person subjective experience.
a. First-person subjective experience of sight
i. Consider someone who is congenitally blind.
ii. If materialism is true, then such a blind person should be able to gain a full knowledge of what it is like, experientially, to see. He could deduce this from the physiology and functional organization of the human eye. He would simply need to be intelligent enough to grasp the concepts.
iii. IN OTHER WORDS, if there’s no such thing as non-material reality, then a blind person misses nothing in terms of knowledge if they cannot see. The blind man can get an adequate conception of physical color as it is described physically in terms of wavelengths of light and the reflective properties of pigment.
iv. But it does seem that a person who can see has a kind of knowledge that a blind-from-birth person could not have.
v. The only thing the blind person fails to grasp by the statement “The traffic lights are red” is that he does not know what kind of physical experience the sighted person has when he sees the traffic lights. John Foster writes: “But this knowledge is precisely what, if conceptual materialism were true, he should be able to deduce from the physical information available.” (“A Defense of Dualism,” in William Lane Craig, Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, p. 457)
vi. Foster writes: “The problem for the blind man is that the physical truths provide no introspective reference points at all. And for this reason, I cannot see how he could derive from them, in any sense, a full knowledge of what it is like, experientially, for the sighted organism to see.
vii. IN OTHER WORDS: There is a kind of knowledge that is non-physical.
viii. Therefore physicalism fails to do justice to first-person subjective experience.
b. The “Zombie Argument” against physicalism
i. A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, sentience, or sapience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. It behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus), but it does not actually have the experience of pain as a person normally does. (See “Philosophical Zombie,” in wikipedia - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie)
c. According to physicalism, physical facts determine all other facts. Therefore, since all the facts about a p-zombie are fixed by the physical facts, and these facts are the same for the p-zombie and for the normal conscious human from which it cannot be physically distinguished, physicalism must hold that p-zombies are not possible. Therefore, zombie arguments support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are possible.
i. NOTE: The zombie argument against physicalism is, therefore, a version of a general modal argument against physicalism, such as that of Saul Kripke's in "Naming and Necessity" (1972).The notion of a p-zombie, as used to argue against physicalism, was notably advanced in the 1970s by Thomas Nagel (1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974).
d. See the “zombie argument against physicalism” developed in detail by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996). According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie world: a world physically indiscernible from our world, but entirely lacking conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that is conscious in our world would be a p-zombie.
e. THE ARGUMENT:
1. If physicalism is true, then it is logically impossible for zombies to exist.
2. It is logically possible for zombies to exist.
3. Therefore, physicalism is false.
4. If it is logically possible for zombies to exist, then consciousness cannot be explained reductively.
5. There is no logically necessary connection between first-person subjective experience (phenomenal consciousness) and the physical world.
i. A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, sentience, or sapience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. It behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus), but it does not actually have the experience of pain as a person normally does. (See “Philosophical Zombie,” in wikipedia - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie)
c. According to physicalism, physical facts determine all other facts. Therefore, since all the facts about a p-zombie are fixed by the physical facts, and these facts are the same for the p-zombie and for the normal conscious human from which it cannot be physically distinguished, physicalism must hold that p-zombies are not possible. Therefore, zombie arguments support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are possible.
i. NOTE: The zombie argument against physicalism is, therefore, a version of a general modal argument against physicalism, such as that of Saul Kripke's in "Naming and Necessity" (1972).The notion of a p-zombie, as used to argue against physicalism, was notably advanced in the 1970s by Thomas Nagel (1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974).
d. See the “zombie argument against physicalism” developed in detail by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996). According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie world: a world physically indiscernible from our world, but entirely lacking conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that is conscious in our world would be a p-zombie.
e. THE ARGUMENT:
1. If physicalism is true, then it is logically impossible for zombies to exist.
2. It is logically possible for zombies to exist.
3. Therefore, physicalism is false.
4. If it is logically possible for zombies to exist, then consciousness cannot be explained reductively.
5. There is no logically necessary connection between first-person subjective experience (phenomenal consciousness) and the physical world.
The claim of Chalmers and others is a strictly logical claim. Which means: Since such a world is logically conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is possible; and if such a world is possible, then physicalism is false. (Note: “square circle,” or “married bachelor,” are examples of concepts that are logically inconceivable.)
Chalmers is arguing only for logical possibility, and he maintains that this is all that his argument requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."
It’s easy to imagine a “zombie.” A “zombie” is a creature physically identical to a human, functioning in all the right ways, having conversations, playing chess, but simply lacking all conscious experience. So if a person can be physically identical to us yet without consciousness, then it would seem that consciousness is not a physical thing.
“There is an explanatory gap here that is really something of an abyss,” says Chalmers.
Chalmers is arguing only for logical possibility, and he maintains that this is all that his argument requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."
It’s easy to imagine a “zombie.” A “zombie” is a creature physically identical to a human, functioning in all the right ways, having conversations, playing chess, but simply lacking all conscious experience. So if a person can be physically identical to us yet without consciousness, then it would seem that consciousness is not a physical thing.
“There is an explanatory gap here that is really something of an abyss,” says Chalmers.
3. Neuroscientific and neuropsychological reasons can be given to support dualism.
a. See especially University of Montreal neuroscientist Mario Beauregard’s The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case For the Existence of the Soul. Beauregard shows how Mental therapy can alter the behavior of the physical brain.
i. This is the claim scientists such as Jeffrey M. Schwartz, a research professor of psychiatry at the University of California at Los Angeles.
1. Schwartz has been treating people with obsessive-compulsive disorders to counter their urges through focused attention of the mind.
2. Scans of his patients’ brains reveal that such mental therapy can alter the behavior of their brains, something that could not happen if the mind emerged entirely from the brain, he says.
ii. See Beauregard, chapter 3 - “Toward a Nonmaterialist Science of Mind.”
1. E.g., Beauregard and others treated patients with OCD using mental therapy. They were “not simply getting patients to change their opinions, but rather to actually change their brains.” (p. 130)
iii. See Beauregard’s studies on the “placebo effect” and the “nocebo effect.”
a. See especially University of Montreal neuroscientist Mario Beauregard’s The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case For the Existence of the Soul. Beauregard shows how Mental therapy can alter the behavior of the physical brain.
i. This is the claim scientists such as Jeffrey M. Schwartz, a research professor of psychiatry at the University of California at Los Angeles.
1. Schwartz has been treating people with obsessive-compulsive disorders to counter their urges through focused attention of the mind.
2. Scans of his patients’ brains reveal that such mental therapy can alter the behavior of their brains, something that could not happen if the mind emerged entirely from the brain, he says.
ii. See Beauregard, chapter 3 - “Toward a Nonmaterialist Science of Mind.”
1. E.g., Beauregard and others treated patients with OCD using mental therapy. They were “not simply getting patients to change their opinions, but rather to actually change their brains.” (p. 130)
iii. See Beauregard’s studies on the “placebo effect” and the “nocebo effect.”
4. Human free will is a serious obstacle to the materialist explanation of human consciousness.
a. The problem for materialists, according to Beauregard, is that the subjective experience of free will necessitates an agent that can sometimes completely override that alleged biological predetermination, or “the roulette wheel’s spin.”
b. A bystander selflessly jumps into a freezing river to save survivors of an airplane crash. That overriding agency cannot be explained in purely materialist terms.
a. The problem for materialists, according to Beauregard, is that the subjective experience of free will necessitates an agent that can sometimes completely override that alleged biological predetermination, or “the roulette wheel’s spin.”
b. A bystander selflessly jumps into a freezing river to save survivors of an airplane crash. That overriding agency cannot be explained in purely materialist terms.
5. Arguments can be made for the truth of Judeo-Christian theism. If the noetic structure of Judeo-Christian theism is true, it is rational to believe that we have souls.
a. See johnpiippo.com for arguments and resources/links/etc. in support of Judeo-Christian theism.
a. See johnpiippo.com for arguments and resources/links/etc. in support of Judeo-Christian theism.
6. A strong historical argument can be made for Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. If there is life after death, then the death of the physical body does not mean the end of consciousness.
a. See johnpiippo.com for arguments/links on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus.
a. See johnpiippo.com for arguments/links on the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus.
7. Personal spiritual experience argues for the existence of the soul.
a. I’ve kept a spiritual journal for 26 years that contains 3000 pages of God communicating with me.
b. I’ve taught a course called “Spiritual Transformation” at many seminaries and in many contexts for 30 years.
c. See also Beauregard, e.g., on spiritual and mystical experience.
a. I’ve kept a spiritual journal for 26 years that contains 3000 pages of God communicating with me.
b. I’ve taught a course called “Spiritual Transformation” at many seminaries and in many contexts for 30 years.
c. See also Beauregard, e.g., on spiritual and mystical experience.
